China and the World

Positive and Negative

2011-12-29T14:50:00.000-08:00

I've been sucked in by a tragic novel (and a TV show adapted from it) lately. The story is almost like an illustration of Tsangyang Gyatso, the 6th Dalai Lama's poem:

First, it's best not to meet, so then you may not love.
Second, it's best not to know each other, so then you may not lovesick.
Third, it's best not to be in accompany, so then you may not owe .
Fourth, it's best not to sympathize, so then you may not recall.
Fifth, it's best not to love,so then you may not abandon.
Sixth, it's best not face to face, so then you may not greet.
Seventh, it's best not to wait for each other, so that you may not let down.
Eighth, it's best not to promise, so that you may not continue.
Ninth, it's best not to depend, so that you may not snuggle.
Tenth, it's best not to encounter, so that you may not reunite.
But to meet is to know. Better never having met than have.
How do I sever myself from you, to avoid missing you in my life and death.

This is more or less The Beatles' "To Know Her is to Love Her" (and various "To Know Him is to Love Him") stated in the negative, which reminds me of the Golden Rule.

In Christianity, the Golden Rule is stated as "so in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you." (Matthew 7:12) In Confucianism, the Golden Rule is "do not do unto others what you do not wish for yourself." (Confucius, The Analects, XV: 24)

I remember when Professor Tu Wei-ming mentioned these Golden Rules in class, he said that these words, though ancient, can shed light on not just individual, but state behavior in history as well as in the modern world. For instance, the expansion of the European empires lead to colonialism, U.S.' power made it assume a leadership role in the global order with active presence in the Middle East as well as Asian Pacific, executing policies informed by the idea of "promoting democracy", leading the war on terror and intervention in Libya, in contrast, even when the ancient Chinese empire had ships reaching far lands, instead of colonialize those people, the emperors were typically content with a nominal recognition as the "son of Heaven" and would splurge for some exotic gifts as tributes in return.

Is there any linguistic or cultural study of why the Chinese tend to state things / act in a negative sense -- "do not"; but Western countries the opposite?

A Deleted Xinhua Article on Kim Jong-Il's Death

2011-12-19T10:53:00.000-08:00

The article was originally published on Xinhua, but deleted within several hours, that is, before it was reposted on one of Caijing's website. The deletion makes the article even more mysterious and makes one wonder what in this article is troublesome to Xinhua's editors and those at the Propaganda Department.

The article is entitled "What happens to North Korea now that Kim Jong-Il is dead?" My translation:

Kim Jong-Il is dead -- (I) wasn't so surprised to hear this. From a natural perspective, everyone dies, no matter how high his position is, how powerful he is, how much his wealth is worth, death is inevitable to everyone. So death is a natural occurrence, any rational person will face it with calm. But Kim Jong-Il's death would still bring his family and friends a sudden pain. Now that Kim Jong-Il is dead, an era has come to an end, what happens to the future North Korea?

The Chinese still have a general favorable feeling about North Korea, because no matter in ancient times or modern times, China and the country a river away have always kept friendly communications. When an ordinary Chinese mentions North Korea, Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il immediately come to their minds. In Kim Il-Sung era, North Korean revolutionary efforts progressed rapidly, and as they were just about to unify the Korean Peninsula, U.S. invasion turned the situation around, and the Korean army was suffering great lost. As their revolution was hanging on a string, and it could be said that it was the most difficult time in North Korea, Mao Zedong firmly made the decision to help North Korea fight against America, and preserved the fruits of North Korean revolution, laid ground of North Korea's map and independent development today. After North Korea entered into Kim Jong-Il era, China and North Korea have kept a close relation.

But the Kim Jong-Il era North Korea is still marred with danger and threats from all sides, especially in the recent several years, it has been facing difficulties domestically and internationally. In diplomacy, North Korea has had a series of incidents. Non stop North-South conflicts; politically, U.S., Japan and other countries are always keep a close eye on North Korea and keep stirring up conflicts in the North and South, imposing several rounds of economic sanctions on North Korea. Militarily, they urged South Korea to having military exercises and making North Korea feel an existential danger. Yet North Korea has held firm its persistent and never-compromise national policy, the submarine incident, the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island almost lead to wars, if not for the mediation and the support from China and Russia, war would have already started. North Korea lack of power would lead it to a fight to death, and this could very much lead to an all-out war or a nuclear war. Economically, North Korea has always followed a policy of seclusion. Its socio-economically development has been slow and its ordinary citizens have a very low living standards. Whenever faced with natural disasters, North Korea would have to depend on neighboring countries' aid.

North Korea's economic difficulties are ingrained into its politics: seclusion policy, tight control over the press, military dictatorship, still exercising planned economy, are the reasons why North Korea are still very backward in its economy. Even though Kim Jong-Il had come to China to visit and study a number of times, revealing that he was considering ways of reform, actual practice has not showed effectiveness.

Kim Jong-Il passed away, leaving behind a North Korea that is economically and politically backward. As his successor, the 28-year-old Kim Jong-un would probably become the new leader, but this succession leaves plenty of room for our imagination. What would happen to the future of North Korea? What road would it take? Would it still pratice the lineage-controlled Communist military dictatorship, or model after China to explore Communist reform, or accept South Korea's unification policy and step on a road to capitalism, all is a question mark.

No matter what road North Korea would take, as a neighbor and former close ally, every Chinese wish North Korea would pass the current difficulty with stability and peace. Of course, we also wish that those countries that are thinking (plotting) something will keep their rationale and give North Korea some time, and let their people voluntarily decide what they want for the future.

The Biggest Challenge in Handling Post-Kim-Jong-Il North Korea

2011-12-19T09:19:00.000-08:00

Forgive me for not being able to rejoice in the death of a dictator. Kim Jong-Il died before he was able to groom his son into a full-fledged credible, powerful successor. No one is able to predict what's going to happen. Of course, when Kim Jong-Il himself took over his father's leadership, the international community had the same worries and made the same predictions: the pending collapse or implosion of the regime.

The biggest challenge in handing post-Kim-Jong-Il North Korea, IMHO, is to align the interests of major foreign players: South Korea, U.S. and China.

President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea had an urgent phone call at midnight tonight, in which Obama assured Lee of U.S. commitments "to the stability on the Korean peninsula, and to the freedom and security of our allies." The press release was extremely short, merely restating the commitment, and stating they would be in close touch, reflecting the caution both administrations took facing the unpredictability of the North Korean situation.

What is noticeably absent is any publicized exchange between the Obama White House and China.

Let's see where each country's interest lies:

For China, the worst fear after Kim's death is the possibility of a regime collapse/ implosion. This could happen in multiple ways, one of which is the scenario of a power struggle leading to a civil war. In which case, China would mostly likely to step in before the spill over reaches its northern province.

For U.S., Kim's untimely death poses the crucial question of who has his finger on North Korea's nuclear button. The possibility of Iran or terrorists gaining access to North Korean nuclear technologies and materials significantly increased now that there is a vacuum in command and control. So in the case of a North Korean implosion, the American troops in South Korea would be the first to step in and secure the nukes.

To make matters worse, the Chinese and U.S. militaries have not talked to each other about their steps in such a scenario -- understandably, Beijing wouldn't want their North Korean "friends" to know that they are actually contemplating the possibility of North Korean collapse with capitalist America -- but as all students of international relations know, mis-understandings/communications could only exacerbate the potential for conflicts.

I can only hope that Beijing and Washington, both civilian government and military, are having candid and rigorous discussions right now, not leaving any scenario off the table.

China's Soul -- A Moving Scene at Taiyuan Railway Station

2011-11-30T14:03:00.001-08:00

The story of a 2-year-old baby girl run over twice while more than a dozen passerbys ignored her in cold blood caused an uproar in China last month.

This morning, these photos caught my eyes.

November 25th, Taiyuan Railway Station, an old man was seen unmoved in his chair for a long time. Some passengers tried to wake him up, only to find him dead cold. They called the police.

A monk at the scene went over to perform the rituals to release his soul from purgatory.

When the high speed railway collided near Wenzhou and the authorities buried the wrecks before any investigation, many in China questioned whether this country have lost its soul for the economic growth. The toddler trategy seems to amplified the voice: "China, please slow down your breakneck pace, wait for your people, wait for your soul, wait for your morals, wait for your conscience! ... Walk slowly and let every life enjoy freedom and dignity. No one should be cast aside by this era."

The Chinese netizens expressed great respect for this monk, but this could change little the grim reality of religious oppression in the country.

I remember in Tu Wei-ming's class, he asked a question: "Can law make people virtuous?"

China has made serious effort to build a more comprehensive legal system. There is few country that has so many laws, regulations, orders and rules coming out all the time, covering almost every conceivable part of the modern society. After the railway collision, from officials in the government, to public intellectuals, and to netizens, people have been calling for more regulations, better oversight, rooting out corruption, etc. They want severe penalty to be imposed on the guilty parties. Same applies to the toddler incident.

But can law make people virtuous? Can law cultivate compassion?

I am worried about the huge inequality in China, which is a source of instabilities and possibly drastic changes in the country in the short term, however I am much more worried about something intangible -- that this once great civilization has lost its soul. These photos give me some hope. And I wish they will make an impact to those who see them.

Premier Zhu Rongji during U.S.- China WTO Negotiations

2011-11-01T12:52:00.000-07:00

The publication of former Premier Zhu Rongji's speeches and conversations is an early Christmas present for all China watchers. Most of the material published in this collection has never before been released.

I had a strong sense of deja vu reading through the four-volume collection, because we are living with the consequences of many of the policies overseen by Zhu during his tenure without realizing how fast those changes have been brought upon us, and at the same time, some of the most paramount challenges we are having today are the same ones troubling him one or two decades ago. I will summarize a few key issues/reoccuring themes in this collection next time, and you can read my friend Damien's translation of some excerpts from his speeches.

In this post, I'd like to share with you Zhu Rongji's comments during China's WTO negotiations with the U.S.. These records show the tremendous domestic pressure he was under, especially with the Ambassy bombing that occured in the middle of the negotiations. Some of his words also reveal the temperament of Jiang Zemin and the relationship between the military and the civilian government. As you will see, Zhu is an extremely straight-talking person, and does not fear to reveal emotions. I hope you find it entertaining.

Meeting with U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Head of National Economic Council Gene Sperling, etc.

Nov. 13, 1999 at 10:30 AM, Zhu Rongji met with U.S. delegation in Zhongnanhai to negotiate China’s entry into WTO

ZHU: I apologize for not notifying you of this meeting until early morning – it was short notice. But I have to make clear of the situation: I’ve been as busy as you are during the negotiations in the past two days, since I’ve got to read all your statements. I even know that Mr. Sperling said six “no”s.

SPERLING: I remember I only said four.

ZHU: … after receiving your letter, we had a midnight meeting that wasn’t over until 3 AM. You can estimate how many hours of sleep I’ve had. But remember, I’m more than 70 years old, much older than you all. Some of you are even younger than my daughter. Now, before we state our position, can we have our honorable guests to speak first? Yet I have to remind you, the longer you speak, the shorter I will.

BARSHEFSKY: … we now have complete authorization … President Clinton, in his letter to Chairman Jiang, has taken back the ten year quota for textile. We have been flexible in telecommunication, insurance and automobile sectors… WTO is far beyond an economic agreement, but has a build-in political understanding…

SPERLING: … I used to think that before the President receives some concessions from China, we shouldn’t make any compromise on textile and general safeguard provisions, but the President persuaded us to make exceptional compromises in order to show China that we are willing to reach an agreement the Chinese people can accept… We hope that China can understand the sensitive issues we raised as well.

ZHU: (Reminded the Americans that China made concession even before April on the agricultural sector.) You come here this time, saying U.S. is making an unprecedented compromise; China is not responding correspondingly; and you are throwing tantrums all over this. I’ll make one point: you don’t know how much concession we’ve made in agriculture. I am blamed by the people in the entire country for this, do you know that?

I reiterate that I will never back away from the concession we’ve made in agriculture, but if we cannot reach an agreement this time, we will never ever make any compromise on the agricultural front!

(On the Two 51% issue -- share of foreign investment in telecommunication and insurance industries) I still think that the “two 51%” issue is not a big problem. I have said this again and again, and to Mr. Summers too, blowing an agreement for a couple of percentage is very stupid. The percentage of foreign investment in insurance companies we have approve so far is as high as 49% sometimes, and sometimes 50%, sometimes even 51%; you could check to see what difference it makes? Not at all! Even for those with 49%, it could be managed by the foreign partner. That’s why the couple of percentages don’t make any actual difference. But why are we insisting on this? Not to go back on our words, but the situation has changed. First of all, it’s because you shouldn’t bomb our Embassy in Yugoslavia… Chinese have always thought that the telecommunication and insurance industries are of vital interests [to the nation]. They think that if I agree to 51%, I’m selling out China’s interests – even though I don’t think so. From there on, a rumor is spreading in and outside of China that “Zhu Rongji is going to quit; [he] is going out of office.” That’s a complete unfounded. But the truth is I’m criticized by all sides. Such criticism comes from the people – they don’t understand the real situation. You don’t understand our public opinion. If I’m not in China, but in the U.S., I would be out of office long ago. Now I have to stick to the “two 51%” in order not to fail the entire population. So I’m happy that you no longer insist on the “two 51%” issue, though it doesn’t have any practical impact, you indeed helped me out on this one. You could tell your insurance industry people that 51 or 50% aren’t really different. I have more friends in the American insurance industry than you do. There is not one big insurance company that I do not know; they’ve all come to me before. They’ll understand.

… Now I’m not speaking from the April 10th documents, but only on the issues where we have a difference in opinion – we both know what these issues are:

1. Automobile. This time you are telling me that this is President Clinton’s political base. Mr. Sperling, I respect your opinion; I compromise, because I respect President Clinton. We’ll reduce import tax to 25% by July 1st 2006 and agree to separate sales of automobile and auto credit… Specifically how to reduce the tax, here you are playing some tricks, is it Mr. Cassidy’s idea? [*Robert Cassidy, then assistant U.S. Trade Representative for China] You demand almost a complete reduction within the first two years; I think a flat reduction over six years would be more convincing, won’t it? I’m not persisting, why bother persisting on these small matters!

2. Special safeguard provision retainment years. Mr. Sperling, you were so mad about this, and must get “returns”, and I am prepared to make some compromise, but is the 15-year term absolutely non-deductable? We responded by proposing 3 years – that is too short. Maybe we can still work this out. Is it possible to reduce a year or two? What about a 10-year term? I think that’s more than enough, if China is not market economy by then, I’d be really pessimistic….

3. Music and movie. … I’m thinking: How important China-US relation is! If we can’t reach an agreement because of a cinema, or because of an Audio-video company, is it worth it? How about let’s say this problem is resolved in principle, with accordance to the April 10th document?

4. Banking. Foreign banks can provide RMB services to corporations within two years and to individuals within five years. I believe there shouldn’t be any more problems on banking; our offer is enough!

5. Securities. It’s very clear that giving permission to foreign securities firm to perform the same businesses the same as Chinese firms is “national treatment”. You included businesses that even Chinese firms aren’t allowed to do, that can’t work.

All these are the most contested issues and I’ve basically, or in principle, made compromises, and that’s all the compromises I could make. The only one issue we cannot make any compromise on, now or in the future, is the international ports of telecommunications. Please understand. Everyone, even the military, would not agree to it. [Zhu used “even”, not “including”. You can see the role/position of the military in relation to the government.]

Nov. 15th, 1999

ZHU: You told us that Ambassador Barshefsky was leaving tomorrow at 8AM. To disappear all of a sudden [the day before] and to leave the next morning without a farewell is very impolite! Mr. Ambassador, you are very experienced as a diplomat. Chairman Jiang called me past midnight yesterday to ask if we’ve found you. He was optimistic and planned to meet you after we reached an agreement. But you called to say that Ambassador Barshefsky planned to meet with Minister Shi [*Shi Guangsheng was then the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation] and would leave at 8:45 AM for the 10 o’clock plane. To be frank, that sounds like an ultimatum. Now I’m still confounded: this doesn’t like a negotiation, but a hide-and-seek. So I have to see you today, because this is absolutely necessary! Otherwise how do I report back to Chairman Jiang? Not telling us whether the agreement is reachable or impossible, and disappearing all of a sudden, is this serious politics? So I want to ask you in person what exactly you are planning to do. Thanks.

[After clearing up the misunderstanding and some discussion over the key issues of disagreements…]

ZHU: … Apart from these key issues, there isn’t anything important or anything that can influence the public opinion and the people’s interests. As for the less important issues, both sides can reach a win-win agreement in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation and according to Chairman Jiang and President Clinton’s conversation. To allow the unimportant issues to hinder our agreement is very unwise. Mr. Barshefsky is my old friend. As for Mr. Sperling, I met [him] last time and didn’t know him well. This time I get to know him more and have a deeper impression of him. Now I don’t have time to negotiate with you; I have to return to chair the meeting before it closes. [* Referring to a nation-wide regional leader meeting on domestic matters, which Zhu described as “far more important than WTO matters”. Zhu went out of the meeting to meet with the American delegation when Jiang was making a speech.] Can we reach an agreement now? Both sides do a press release. If you can accept our conditions, we can reach a historical agreement, achieve a win-win outcome, and solve other problems according to the mutual understanding and accommodation principle. Whether or not this can be signed, I hope you would give a clear answer, though this is not an ultimatum. Compared to Mr. Sperling, I normally have a bigger temper, yet I’ve not raised my temper with you, but [this time] even Chairman Jiang does not have the patience any more.

…

ZHU: Which premier in the world can discuss these matters with you in such details?

BARSHEFSKY: The only person is the President of the United States. He also understands a lot of details [of trade issues].

ZHU: He [President Clinton] is very smart. But if him debates with me on China’s entry into WTO, he may not win.

Allow me to make a few observations:

1. You can see how such high level politics in China almost seems personal: look at the way he talks about knowing Barshefsky personally, getting to know Sperling, respect for Clinton, and personal connections with the people in the American insurance industry.

2. Pressure from public opinion does affect China's foreign policy, contrary to conventional belief that the Communist regime has complete monopoly over the media and its strong propoganda apparatus and indoctrination/education system have everyone in the nation brainwashed.

3. From his way of speech, you can almost say that he is a little bit hot tempered, whereas Chairman Jiang Zemin seems to be the milder one. Zhu definitely seems very confident, and good at prioritization -- you can see that he was very stern on the key issues yet much more flexible on others (such as foreign investment in the insurance industry/telecommunications, etc.) than other Chinese bureaucrats.

What do you see from these negotiations?

My Views on The Atlantic - "5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War"

2011-10-31T22:26:00.000-07:00

This just came out today. It's 1:08 AM, so I don't have the time / faculty for a thought-through response, but here are a few observations.

1. There is no such thing as "accidental nuclear war". Case in point, Cuban missile crisis.

2. China/Philippines island dispute wouldn't be my first choice of serious threat. Taiwan could be. Despite the escalation of tension over the South China Sea over the past couple of years, which could be seen as "testing waters", China's commitment in its "core interest" Taiwan is much more long-term-standing; and neither U.S. or China would backpedal on their commitments there. More on this later.

3. I'm not worried about "intra-Korea war" as much as the possibility of a North Korean implosion/ collapse, which could be a real possibility with the coming succession. The scenario of a DPRK faction struggle leading to a civil war would cause China to step in and march across the Amnok River again; U.S. troops in South Korea would not sit still either. This could be a very likely launching pad for another China-U.S. war on the Peninsula. The worst thing is, there is no U.S.-China military discussion on this matter at all for [China's] fear that, its North Korean allies knowing that China is considering a plan B for the Kim regime.

4. China and India territorial dispute would not escalate to a U.S.-China nuclear confrontation; but India-Pakistan conflicts could. More on this later.

These are just my quick thoughts on Max Fisher's article. Any comments, disagreements?

China's "New Currency" Speaks Housing Woe: 1 Pan = 1000RMB/sq m

2011-10-26T14:38:00.000-07:00

(1 Pan: front)

(1 Pan back)

Chinese real estate guru Pan Shiyi, Chairman of Soho China, released a new "bank note" (above) yesterday with his own image and a tagline "SOHO China is Awesome" replacing "China People's Bank" in the real one RMB note on the front. On the back, 1 Pan note says "Once the idea of war emerges, it needs to be supressed by more powerful thoughts of peace. (One) should use more intense thoughts of friendship and love to diminish hatred."

(real 1 RMB note)

It started with Pan Shiyi, in his microblog posts to commemorate Steve Jobs, proposed that Apple should produce iPhone and iPad that cost less than 1,000 RMB ($157) so that more people could afford these products. Chinese netizens, long been outrageous towards the ultra high home prices, replied by saying Pan should offer apartments priced at 1,000 RMB/sq. meter and that this should be a new measurement. Pan probably took the joke as a good marketing opportunity; indeed he encouraged such discussions and calls for him to release a new 1 Pan currency that stands for 1,000 RMB/ sq. meter. At 11AM today (Oct. 26th), Pan Shiyi officially released the design of 1 Pan on his microblog and asked for feedbacks.

Jokes aside, Beijing's efforts in trying to cool home prices has so far hardly seen significant result. Apart from being a sign of economic growth, the soaring housing price is a result of structurally low real interest rates

(particularly relative to income growth), high saving (and therefore ample liquidity), and a lack of alternative investment and property tax.

To me, the government's control over the banks is a major problem. On the one side is state-owned enterprises that get loans with extremely advantageous terms; on the other side is regular depositors getting about 3% interests (which is a de facto negative return for their savings). I can't see how this imbalance could be solved without a certain degree of liberalization of the banking sector.

In the meantime, I'll relish the all the jokes about the new Pan currency, while lamenting the fact that I probably could never afford to buy a home in my hometown back in China.

Debate with a Top 1% / Tax Lawyer

2011-10-12T17:52:00.000-07:00

I had a conversation with a good friend yesterday about the tax issue and the row between We are the 99% and 53%. My friend is a tax lawyer at an elite law firm in New York, and definitely belongs to the top 1%.

It went something like this:

Me: Warren Buffet is the one who said that he paid a lower percentage than anyone in his office.

My friend: He didn't take into account that the profit from his companies and all kinds of transactions have already been taxed. In any case, the tax increase he's advocating doesn't really affect him that much -- everyone wants someone else' tax be increased.

Me: But the richest 1% control 40 something percent of the nation's wealth, and they pay so little. (and infographs here and here.)

My friend: People are easily misguided by simple comparison between some numbers. The tax system is very complicated; you can't just drag two numbers together and say it's not fair.

Me: So how come big coorporations that made a profit paid negative tax ( GE had $10.3 billion in pretax income and reported a tax benefit of $1.1 billion.) and hugely profitably oil companies like Exxon Mobile can claim nearly $4 million subsidies each year???

My friend: I don't know the details of these companies, but sometimes even when these companies are globally profitable, it doesn't mean that they made a profit in the U.S., or they had a huge loss in the past year and was rolled into the next time period. For instance, BP's huge loss would roll down to several years.

Me: So if you don't support taxing the rich, i.e. yourself, how do you suppose we resolve the revenue problem?

My friend: The current tax system doesn't work. It's much more complex than it has to be, and has resulted in a lot of inefficiencies. We don't have a straightforward tax code, instead, the Congress passed a lot of separate laws to say we'll give something tax credit up until 2016 (e.g. wind turbines), or give certain companies a tax break. Someone needs to keep track of all these miscellaneous changes all the time. Companies need to hire many lawyers and accountants to do taxes. All these costs are passed on to the consumers, causing prices to be higher than they have to be. That is such a waste.

Me: If the tax system is simple and straightforward, you, my friend, wouldn't have a job.

It's probably not smart to have a debate on tax issues with a tax lawyer, but does anyone have any evidence either to support to oppose my friend's argument?

Is U.S. in Decline?

2011-10-10T14:41:00.001-07:00

This article appeared recently in a leading Chinese international relations journal and has got a lot of attention. Below is a précis. Most of the arguments should be familiar to many Americans, in fact, many of the arguments are probably found on the cardboards at #OccupyWallStreet. Isn't it refreshing when a scholar from the "competiting power" put it out like this?

Is U.S. in Decline?
Chu Shulong
Beijing: Contemporary International Relations, April 20, 2011, 1-6

Summary: No fundamental changes have occurred in the key American strengths such as the economy, science and technology, military strength, international political influence, cultural softpower, etc., though U.S. currently face localized difficulties and problems.

U.S. is still way ahead of the world in the following fundamental areas:

1. long-term economic growth

2. stability and influence of the political system, ideology and values. (Though greatly suffered as a result of the Iraq War)

3. science and technology, innovation. (Nobel Prizes, IT/ aviation & aerospace/ biotech/ agricultural/ military technology industries) [Ella: cue Steve Jobs]

4. the global competitiveness of U.S. companies

5. softpower/ culture (Hollywood; higher education system that attracts world’s talents)

Facing problems in the following areas:
1. competitive power of manufacturing industry dropped. [Ella: but does a developed economy necessarily need a strong manufacturing industry? What about making the transition to higher value chain? See case “The High Way to High Wages: Denmark's Answer to the U.S. Model".]

2. decline in the health, stability and quality of service industry: due to the lack of regulation of the finance sector (political funding from the big corporations; inability to regulate Wall St.; quality of service sector decline)

3. inequality in wealth distribution; middle-class not doing well; unsustainable: middle class income has grown little after the 1980s despite the growing economy, which affects the long-term economic growth because of the consumption-based economic model

4. fiscal and trade deficits: public expenditure constrained, government unable to make investment in social and economic development; danger of inflation which may cause dollar depreciation and drop in U.S.’ international competitive power

5. military spending and international strategy: “They have spent too many funds and resources on military affairs, foreign wars and foreign interference. The U.S. has not spent more wealth on its own development… To a certain extent, the U.S. is taking the wrong path that other big countries, such as the former Soviet Union, have already taken in history.”

6. population growth not accompanied by improved population quality: “Over the years, the main source for population growth in the U.S. was legal and illegal immigration from Latin America and their quite high birth rate. This group of people is generally recognized as a group with a quite low educational background, quite poor English, quite low income, quite weak consumption power, and few skills in the U.S.”

7. lax social culture and values: expansion of personal desires and power consciousness, and a decline in a sense of duty; will in learning and working hard is not strong; quality of basic education in the U.S. is not high. (Neoconservatives have tried to change but due to some of their extreme policies and actions, their influence in U.S. politics and society has gradually declined.)

How Much CO2 Does Each China's Coal Power Plant Emit?

2011-08-07T21:17:00.000-07:00

For a more complete methodology/data of my estimation, visit my law school blog.

Below is a graph (click for full picture) showing emissions from two dozens of power plants owned by Huaneng, biggest power company in China. Data on the left is measured by thousand tons.

China Built the Fastest Train in the World and Blames its Clash on Lightenings

2011-07-24T15:32:00.000-07:00

.

I am beyond rage.

The video below shows that less than 10 hours after the train clash in China, while the injured are still being taken out of the compartments, half a dozen bulldozers have started pulling, rolling (and what looks like burying) the train on the spot.

I'm no engineer, but even I know that if you want to investigate the cause of the accident, and/or if you want to search carefully enough to make sure that no one is still trapped inside the compartments somewhere, you DO NOT destroy them.

The accident happened on July 23, 10:38 PM.

The rescue ended about four hours later at at 2 AM on the 24th.

State news media claimed that there was no sign of life at around 4 AM. That was when the bulldozers were called in.

At around 5 PM, a two-year old girl was found in the train debris.

How many more people were inside when they started crushing, dissecting, compressing and burying the train? No one knows.

Shanghai Railway Bureau Chief, his Deputy, and Party Secretary got fired. -- But they are not the ones who commissioned, built and supervised this line.

Officials from the Ministry of Railways claimed that the railway is fit to be up and running at 7 PM -- less than 24 hours from the accident, and before the cause is properly investigated.

I do not blame this on corruption -- a word everyone is so jaded hearing that it has become the chair the officials sit on.

This shows their lack of basic human decency.

*** Yes, I'm aware that the officials have denied that they were burying the train, but if dozens of witnesses who had been watching their action for hours all say the train was being buried -- who would you trust?

UPDATE: The video I originally posted, from a Hong Kong media, has been taken down. It also disappeared from other Chinese video host websites.

I'm Graduating from Harvard in a Week! & The Next Big Thing

2011-05-18T21:02:00.000-07:00

Exciting, but uncertain times.

Instead of going to career fairs and networking sessions, I'm taking advantage of my soon-to-expire Harvard card as much as I can: checking out a bunch of library books on smart grid, cyber security, renewable energy financing, etc and downloading as many journal articles as I can on these subjects. Having massive scholarly research at hand gives me a sense of security -- yes, I'm a nerd.

I went to Harvard's Office of Career Service the other day and was told that I made every mistake international students tend to make, like replying to online job vacancy postings (over 90% of which are already filled before going online), and subtitling the last section of resume as "Extracurriculum" while American students would call it "Leadership Experience."

My main objection to the whole job-searching enterprise is that the time and energy spent on it has nothing to do with actually doing one's future job better - unless (s)he wants to be a career counselor.

I think I should stuck with the only strategy I have, and has proven to be successful - by being excellent in what I do. In order to get there though, I need your help.

So if you have any recommendation on

experts I should seek out,
books/articles I should read,
newsgroups I should subscribe or
groups/communities I should join

on the subjects of cyber security (esp. in relation to smart gird) and renewable energy financing, please let me know. Thank you!

It has been smashing two years in Cambridge, and I can't wait for the next big thing!

Sat. April 9: China Energy & Environment Conference

2011-03-31T10:46:00.000-07:00

Never before have we confronted the environmental and energy challenges with such urgency, and never before has U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy in both public and private sector been more crucial. This is the reason why Harvard, MIT and our friends on the West Coast serendipitously decided to hold a conference on this issue on the same date: Harvard's China Energy & Environment Conference and Berkeley-Stanford Cleantech Conference.

Register now for China Energy & Environment Conference, or come to Harvard's Northwest Science Building on April 9th and register on site!

For China Energy & Environment Conference, we will have the wonderful Susan Tierney, Managing Principal of Analysis Group, as our keynote speaker. Among her impressive list of experiences and credentials, she is a former Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Energy, chairperson of the board of the Energy Foundation and a co-chair of the National Commission on Energy Policy. In Massachusetts, Sue is previously Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Chair of the Board of the Massachusetts Water Resources Agency, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, and executive director of the Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Council. She also serves on the China Sustainable Energy Program’s Policy Advisory Council, which, for the past decade, has been supporting China’s policy efforts to increase energy efficiency and promoting the use of renewable energy sources. As a Director for the conference, I can't think of a better person to address our audience on U.S. - China nexus in renewable energy and we are really lucky to have Sue coming.

In addition, we will have Secretary Steven Chu addressing us through a video-feed from Stanford and have a Q & A session with our audience. The title of his talk would be "Sputnik 2.0? The Pursuit of Green Jobs in China and the U.S.". As United States Secretary of Energy, Dr. Steven Chu is charged with helping implement President Obama's ambitious agenda to invest in clean energy, reduce our dependence on foreign oil, address the global climate crisis, and create millions of new jobs. Dr. Chu is a distinguished scientist and co-winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics (1997). He has devoted his recent scientiﬁc career to the search for new solutions to our energy challenges and stopping global climate change - a mission he continues with even greater urgency as Secretary of Energy.

We are going to have six panels, five in English and one in Chinese. They are:

Rural Environmental Issues: Coping with Rapid Development

This panel will address issues in environmental systems management in China’s rural areas, drawing connections between public health and the urgent need to begin cleaning and protecting rural environments.

Moderator

Charles Chester, Lecturer in Environmental Studies, Brandeis and Tufts University

Panelists

Diane Gold, Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Health, Harvard University
Saleem H. Ali, Director of the Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security, The Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Vermont
Rachel Stern, Harvard Society of Fellows, Harvard University
Ma Haibing, China Program Manager, WorldWatch Institute

The Future of Transportation: Motor Vehicles

This panel will address current transportation policies in China and the opportunities and challenges facing the private sector as it seeks to deploy clean vehicles in the domestic market.

Moderator

Henry Lee, Senior Lecturer at Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School

Panelists

Feng An, President and Executive Director, Innovation Center for Energy and Transportation (ICET)
Hongyan He Oliver, Former Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School
Pricilla M. Lu, Chairwoman, Zap Jonway Electric Vehicle

Shifting from Coal: The Future of Renewable Electricity

This panel will address the efﬁcacy of the Chinese government’s subsidies and incentives for clean technology, focusing on renewable electricity.

Moderator

Joel Eisen, Professor of Law, University of Richmond

Panelists

David Mohler, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Ofﬁcer, Duke Energy
David Lam, Managing Partner, WI Harper
Mitchell Dong, Serial Entrepreneur and CEO, Mohave Sun Power
Chris Dann, Managing Partner of Energy Practice, Booz & Compan

Doing Business with China: Bilateral Energy Investment

This panel will address opportunities and challenges for foreign direct investors in Chinese energy production, distribution, and sales.

Moderator

Regina Abrami, Professor at Harvard Business School

Panelists

Peter Evans, Director of Global Strategy and Planning, GE Energy
David Mohler, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Ofﬁcer, Duke Energy
Tim Rosenzweig, CEO, Goldwind USA
Daniel Goldman, Executive Vice President and CFO, GreatPoint Energy

Green from the Bottom Up: Energy and Environmental Entrepreneurs

This panel will address the challenges and opportunities facing young entrepreneurs in China’s energy and environmental sectors.

*Working language: Chinese, with simultaneous translation into English on screen*

Moderator

Tao Zhang, COO of New Ventures at World Resources Institute

Panelists

Yucheng Yang, Chairman, Sinen En-Tech
Guoqiang Gao, Founder and Board Chairman, Ecostar
Zhen Liu, Director, Shenyang SMEs Credit Guarantee Center
Walter Ge, Director, New Ventures Chin

The Built Environment: Improving Energy Efﬁciency in Buildings

This panel will address innovation in China’s development and construction industries, exploring the optimal designs, materials, and ﬁnancing mechanisms to lead to more sustainable buildings.

Moderator

John Macomber, Senior Lecturer in Real Estate, Harvard Business School

Panelists

Taryn Sullivan, President, Efﬁciency Exchange (EEx)
Julian Wong, Policy Advisor, Department of Energy
Chris Schaffner, Founder and Principal, The Green Engineer, LLP
Colin Rohlﬁng, Senior Associate | Group Sustainable Design Director, HOK
Eric Johnson, Executive Cost Manager, Gardiner & Theobald s.r.

If you are in Boston area next Saturday, do come over and join us for this event!

Students-DIYed Hydropower in Chinese High School

2011-02-20T09:08:00.000-08:00

Students from my high school, Hangzhou Foreign Language School (HFLS), designed and installed a hydro-powered LED lighting project on our campus, and made a video about it. It's super cool, and yes, all this is shot in our high school campus. It's one of the best high schools in the country, with fancy campus (as you'll see in the video) and first-class education (I wrote a few words on the unique education in my high school in a post on gaokao for James Fallows).

Check out the video:

Zizek: Freedom is Universal

2011-02-12T16:39:00.000-08:00

Regarding the historical events in Egypt, and Tunisia, I can't possibly put it better than Zizek here: "... how cheap and irrelevant all this multiculturalism talk becomes; there when we are fighting a tyrant, we are all universalists. We are all immediately solidary with each other. This is how you build universal solidarity, not with some stupid UNESCO, multiculture, respect, we respect your culture..... The struggle for freedom. Here we have a direct proof that freedom is universal... This is universalism at work." Bravo, Zizek!

(h/t @mtwirth for the video)

A Chinese New Year Video & The American Dream

2011-02-05T16:39:00.000-08:00

Happy Year of the Rabbit!

The advertisement below were broadcast during the Spring Festival Gala, one of THE most expensive air time on Chinese TV. The familiar story of the ad moved thousands of oversea Chinese students to tears.

Why I found this video particularly interesting:

The development of China's Internet business

The ad is for Tencent QQ, the most used instant messaging software in China with 636.6 million active accounts. And the occasion is Spring Festival Gala, a traditional family event when virtually every household in China sit down for a Thanksgiving-like dinner while watching this show. The idea that a software/website company will buy over 2 minutes airtime during the Gala would be unthinkable five years ago, but now with China's Internet population stands at 457 million, the ad has become one of the most talked about part of the Gala.

The American Dream

The video spread like a wild fire among the oversea Chinese communities because it tells the typical story of a young Chinese with a "dream" (as mentioned in the ad): prep hard for the exam; wave goodbye to family in the airport (Beijing Airport in this case); pursue study at a top American University (this video shows, as many would recognize, Columbia University); get a job in a big American city (looks like a consulting job in New York). Last year alone, 128,000 Chinese students came to the U.S., pursuing more or less the same dream. They make up of the largest percentage (nearly 18%)of the international student body in the U.S..

Is U.S. still going to be the place where young people around the world dream to learn, to make their career and realize their potential? Is it going to keep the openness?

Around me among the Chinese community at Harvard, I've already begun to hear people saying they'll probably go back to China after graduation because of the difficulty in getting a job and the required work visa in the U.S. and also because the potential for growth they are seeing back at home. How is U.S. going to maintain its attractiveness to world talent? Ten years from now, will we see a different version of this ad?

In the meantime, as Will Moss pointed out and I can't agree more, the people who did this video should handle China's "soft power" campaign.

Translation and subtitles: Ella Chou

Some of Liu Xiaobo's Writing (English Translations)

2010-10-08T19:59:00.000-07:00

Greed's Prisoner
Translated by Jeffrey Yang

The Internet is God's Present to China
Translated by the EastSouthWestNorth blog

Poetry
Translated by Jeffrey Yang

Authoritarianism in the Light of the Olympic Flame
from China’s Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges
Translated by Tong Yi

Statement at Trial: I Have No Enemies, Final Statement
Translated by J. Latourelle

Letter from China - My Ill-Fated "Xiangqin" Experience

2010-08-27T18:43:00.000-07:00

My mom only has one plan for my three-week back-to-China trip: finding me an ideal husband. A month before I dragged my luggage to Logan Airport, she already has three candidates lined up: my high school teacher introduced a former student of her colleague - imaging how my teacher received a call from my mom one day, seven years after the final class I took with her, asking for this special favor; words got around in the campus that Ella is looking for a husband, then the colleague, from the next building(!) suggested a candidate; phone calls were made, candidate was chosen and this awkward date was set up.

The second candidate is introduced by my mom's former patient - and the process is no less embarrassing. Apparently, my mom (a head nurse) was complaining to the nurses in her office about my lack of initiative to find her a son-in-law, and one of the nurses relayed the information when their former patients came to visit. After a Eureka moment, one of the patients suggested that her nephew, whom she hasn't seen for 2 years, would be a perfect husband candidate for the head nurse's daughter she has never met.

And the third one is the son of my aunt-in-law's brother's co-worker's cousin. I won't even attempt to know how this connection is made.

The very fact that my mom went through all these layers of connections to find me an ideal husband spoke of the zeal Chinese mothers put in matchmaking.

But there is more. Almost all of my closest girl friends have been in my shoes before. They, like me, plunged into some of the best high education China has to offer and came out capable and independent. They are no longer the mommy's girls that would nod to whoever comes along offering a warm apartment and a stay-at-home life. This doesn't mean that the guys don't market themselves that way though - as many as "gold-worshipper girls" (bai jin nu), there are guys who ask girls out by saying "I have a monthly salary of ... I have my own house and a car". A friend of mine rejected two such guys in one day, and now she is still single.

Han Jun Wei's set of photos depicted the unsatisfying dating choices "new Chinese women" face, but the truth is that as much as my girl friends pick and choose and toss away their suitors, there are many guys who do not like the new generation of Chinese women. My friends have told me that their previous match-making dates had stopped contacting them after the first date because they (the girls) "have their own opinion" (you zhu jian) - they are not the traditional Chinese beauties that rely entirely on her husband in every way, without an independent mind to speak of.

In 2008, female college graduates amounts to 52.96% of total graduates, which means that the year 2008 alone created over 40 thousand more women with a college degree than men with the same degree, according to China Year Book 2009. All the while, China has a male surplus of 3% of the population, around 400 million more males than females in total. That is to say, if the Chinese women insist on only marrying men with equal or higher levels of education, and/or if the men demands superiority over women, mismatches would be the common theme in this generation's dating culture.

A gap is emerging between the Chinese men, many still have their heads rooted in the ancient patriarchy ideal of family and unable to accept an equally capable woman into "his" family, and the women, growing more successful, and independent than before and in some ways superior than men. I'm not sure if we'll see the "end of men" in China as Hanna Rosin predicts for the U.S. but things are not looking good for Chinese men to say the least - and if they cannot respect women's rising position in the society we are going to see way more sulky single men than the society may tolerate.

Alas, this is the story of how I'm deemed unmarriable.

China to Levy Environmental Tax – Don’t Cheer Yet

2010-08-26T23:21:00.000-07:00

Environmental tax is not a niche idea - China has been contemplating an environmental tax regime for some years now, see previous coverage: 2007, 2008, 2009. And after our "grizzled" China-watcher has waited for an entire year, Beijing announced its plan to reform the taxation system, of which the introduction of an environmental tax could be an important component.

To shed light on the possible new tax regime, People's Daily interviewed Su Ming, associate director of the Research Institute for Fiscal Science of the Chinese Ministry of Finance, and you can read the English translation by my friend Graham Webster here.

In China's existing taxation system of 19 items, five major ones are environmentally related: resource tax, consumer tax, motor vehicle tax, value-added tax and corporate income tax. A comprehensive environmental tax regime could include the "greening" of the existing taxes, and the creation of a separate environmental tax.

Take the consumer tax for instance. Established in 1994, it now has 14 items, 8 of which are related to environment, and they are: fireworks, motorcycles, cars, cigarettes and alcohol, wood-made disposable chopsticks, refined oil products, and hardwood flooring. Note that the taxation on disposable chopsticks and hardwood flooring are added in 2006, signaling a progress in China's environmental-consciousness in taxation.

Similarly, the other existing taxes could be adjusted for the benefit of environmental protection. The current environmental tax under discussion would primarily be a new separate tax including carbon tax, and hopefully, tax on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and industrial water pollutants - four biggest environmental enemies in China today. The next step could be solid waste, garbage tax, noise tax, etc.

However the tax is defined at last, we should pay particularly attention to two things:

1. Measurement of the pollutants or environmental impact, which would be the basis for the tax, requires not only competent agents of action, be it local environmental bureau or other agencies, but also strong and vibrant citizen participation. As seen from the utilization of the current Environmental Impact Assessment Law, local environmental bureaus are extremely weak (as opposed to the local enterprises), with the exception of Beijing Environmental Bureau, and so far voluntary citizen groups have been the primary agents in provoking this law to protect their living environment. To make the environmental tax system work, China has to give environmental NGOs and private citizens more space to act as a check on the industries.

2. Revenue-neutral. In the interview Graham translated, Su Peng said the taxation would receive support among local governments because of their revenue increase. Yet it is crucial that the taxation does not increase the already immense inequality. We can all name a dozen reasons why a proposed environmental tax would affect the poor much more than the rich. But in China, because of the type of jobs those heavy industries or coal fire plants offer, it is very likely that those factories and power plants would just shift the extra tax burden onto their uneducated, short-contracted (many even without a contract) workers. So this calls for more rigorous enforcement of Labor Law and Labor Contract Law in addition to a social welfare net to ensure that the cost does not shift to the poor. Many proposals of balancing the environmental tax revenue suggest using the revenue in environmental restoration or reallocating neighborhoods around the heavy-industry factories. Either way, this should be of main concern to the policy makers.

Letter from China

2010-08-17T08:41:00.000-07:00

Landed in Shanghai several days ago, I was soon reminded of how overwhelming the city is: white heat, endless streams of loud cars, and equally ferocious bicycles and motorcycles.

One of the first thing I did was to look for a bank that could let me withdraw cash from my Bank of America account. I was told that a CITIC Bank was two bus stops away - it was not long before I realized that the distance between two Shanghai bus stops was almost twice their U.S. counterpart; and the distance between Harvard Square to MIT (two subway stops away) was nothing compared to the same thing in Shanghai. Also, I learned that day that Chinese banks did not process foreign debit card withdrawal - or so I was told.

The minute I got back home, I had to battle with the omnipresent Great Firewall of China: Google feeds - blocked, twitter - blocked, this very own blog host - blocked. I started searching for the software and plugins I used to use to bypass the GFW but found all of their websites were blocked; the few that remain accessible only offer proxy solutions for PC. Yes, China is still predominantly a PC (and IE) nation. My only option is to use the painfully-slow Harvard VPN for the moment.

The Shanghainese I stayed with are extremely proud of the Expo. Granted, they have complaints: they complain that the whole nation has to pay for the Beijing Olympics, but it is the Shanghai government who got the bill of the entire Shanghai Expo, including the China Pavilion; they complain about the millions of outsiders (wai di ren) flushing into the city and the trouble of managing thousands of volunteers (the couple are university administrators and former Ministry of Education officials). I asked what would the money be spent on if it's not used in the Expo, their answer was equivocal - we have tacit knowledge that Chinese governments, unlike their American counterparts, are the ones hoarding the big bulks, as opposed to private citizens, and in this Communist country, unlike Denmark or Sweden, little of the money goes into social welfare. No one really knows how much the Expo cost exactly, but as the Shanghainese couple commented, the main cost went to upgrading Shanghai's infrastructure - $45 billion. But shall people worry about the quality of the subway lines that were built so fast, given the ubiquitous corruption in the construction business in China? And what about the displaced households, silenced dissidents, and the migrant workers who are again jobless in Shanghai after the construction work?

Still, my friends were very proud of the Expo and urged me to go despite my reluctance. They raved about how magnificent the architecture was, how many country brought a few pieces of their treasure, and of course, how the China Pavilion was absolutely spectacular with a giant high-tech version of the nation's most famous ancient painting scroll and the most valued terra cotta warrior and chariot set from Xi'an.

So I went to the Expo and was shocked: I had never seen so many people at one place in my life - and I grew up in China! It's astonishing that millions of people were here in the scorching sun just to stand for hours in lines to see what essentially was just a big room with a short film about a foreign country and another room with picture displays - and another big room about a different foreign country, and another one. This is my genuine comment about the entire Expo with no disrespect for any of the participating countries. I went to some of the most loved Pavilions including Spain and Italy, but I have to say, waiting for 9 hours on a 40-degree-Celsius day to see them is just insane. [My favorite is Holland, and that might get its own post]

And here I am in my hometown Hangzhou, after merely an hour's train ride from Shanghai - one of the fastest train line in China. I still have to figure out how to beat the Great Firewall while (re)adjusting to my life back in China - that turned out to be more difficult than recovering from the jet leg. Wish me luck:)

Oh by the way, the best proof that I'm back in China:

street vendors in Shanghai selling DVDs of pirated movies, TV shows and computer games.

China's Renewable Energy Policy

2010-08-03T13:34:00.000-07:00

If you only read one article today, I hope you'd read Mayer Brown report on China's renewable energy policy, which offers both the grand picture and the details of developments in China's energy law and regulations. Before this, we've seen news of China's plan to use market measures - levy carbon tax and raise petroleum price - to mitigate consumption of traditional-energy. And in March, China has already surpassed U.S. as the world's largest investor in renewable energy.

Yet these changes seem to be not early enough - just a couple of days ago, news broke out that China has overtaken U.S. as the world's largest energy consumer, in total, not per capita.

See the data below: (i LOVE charts!)

Total Energy Consumption - U.S. and China (Million tons of oil equivalents),

2009 number is estimation

Total Energy Consumption Per Capita - U.S. and China (Million tons of oil equivalent)

China's renewable energy investment/policy is definitely the most important news to watch. For a detailed report of global green energy investment, check out this.

First Chinese Rating of Global Sovereign Credit - Guess what's the rank of U.S.?

2010-07-11T20:51:00.000-07:00

Dagong Global Credit Rating released sovereign credit ratings of 50 countries, and according to China Daily, it's "the first non-Western rating agency to assess the world's sovereign credit and risks". It claims to be "privately owned" and "pledges to make its judgments impartially". The report rated U.S. government debt AA with a negative outlook, and U.K. an AA-, while China got an AA+.

A challenge to the established global credit rating system, or a long-needed alternative from a non-western entity? Dagong seems to believe that they are in the role of a hero.

Dagong's chairman, Guan Jianzhong, said the current Western-led rating system is to blame for the global crisis and Europe's debt woes. He said it "provides the wrong credit-rating information" and fails to reflect changing conditions.

How much do the west make of this report? What will its impact be, economic or otherwise? It's too soon to know and I awaits for insights from economists and analysts. One of the first reactions come from The Money Game (Business Insider), arguing that this is a good marketing strategy. The complete credit rating report is available in Chinese here. And I translated it into English, see below; or visit it on a webpage here.


Number	Country	National Currency Rating	National Currency Outlook	Foreign Currency Rating	Foreign Currency Outlook


1	Norway	AAA	Stable	AAA	Stable
2	Denmark	AAA	Stable	AAA	Stable
3	Luxembourg	AAA	Stable	AAA	Stable
4	Switzerland	AAA	Stable	AAA	Stable
5	Singapore	AAA	Stable	AAA	Stable
6	Australia	AAA	Stable	AA+	Stable
7	New Zealand	AAA	Stable	AA+	Stable
8	Canada	AA+	Stable	AA+	Stable
9	Netherland	AA+	Stable	AA+	Stable
10	China	AA+	Stable	AAA	Stable
11	Germany	AA+	Stable	AA+	Stable
12	Saudi Arabia	AA	Stable	AA	Stable
13	United States	AA	Negative	AA	Negative
14	South Korea	AA-	Stable	AA	Stable
15	Japan	AA-	Negative	AA	Stable
16	United Kingdom	AA-	Negative	AA-	Negative
17	France	AA-	Negative	AA-	Negative
18	Belgium	A+	Stable	A+	Stable
19	Chile	A+	Stable	A+	Stable
20	South Africa	A	Stable	A	Stable


21	Malaysia	A	Stable	A	Stable
22	Estonia	A	Stable	A	Stable
23	Russia	A	Stable	A	Stable
24	Poland	A	Stable	A-	Stable
25	Spain	A	Negative	A	Negative
26	Israel	A-	Stable	A-	Stable
27	Brizil	A-	Stable	A-	Stable
28	Italy	A-	Negative	A-	Negative
29	Portugal	A-	Negative	A-	Negative
30	India	BBB	Stable	BBB	Stable
31	Thailan	BBB	Stable	BBB	Stable
32	Mexico	BBB	Stable	BBB	Stable
33	Kazakhstan	BBB	Stable	BBB-	Stable
34	Hungary	BBB	Negative	BBB-	Negative
35	UAE	BBB	Negative	BBB	Negative
36	Indonesia	BBB-	Stable	BBB-	Stable
37	Egypt	BB+	Stable	BBB-	Stable
38	Venezuela	BB+	Stable	BB+	Stable
39	Nigeria	BB+	Stable	BB+	Stable
40	Romania	BB+	Negative	BB	Negative


41	Greece	BB	Stable	BB	Stable
42	Turkey	BB	Stable	BB-	Stable
43	Iceland	BB	Negative	BB-	Negative
44	Vietnam	BB-	Stable	BB-	Stable
45	Mongolia	B+	Stable	B+	Stable
46	Phillipins	B+	Stable	B+	Stable
47	Argentina	B	Stable	B	Stable
48	Ukrain	B	Stable	B-	Stable
49	Pakistan	B-	Negative	B-	Negative
50	Ecuador	CCC	Stable	CCC	Stable

US Treasury Report on China’s Economic Policies

2010-07-09T21:17:00.000-07:00

U.S. Treasury's released its Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies yesterday, you can download the whole report here, or view the China section only on Wall Street Journal.

Much of the recent decline in China’s trade surplus, however, is likely a result of cyclical or temporary factors. Most importantly, there has been a significantly larger than normal growth differential between China and the rest of the world during the crisis period. Due in part to its timely and large-scale stimulus, China’s economic slowdown was shallower than that of most of the rest of the world, and its economy began to recover much earlier. This resulted in much higher domestic demand growth in China relative to its major trading partners. According to the People’s Bank of China, China’s economic output has been above the economy’s potential since the end of 2009. By March 2010, real industrial production was running 3 percent above potential. In comparison, according to the IMF, advanced economies, which are the end destination for the majority of China’s exports, were running an output gap of 4.5 percent in 2009 and projected to run an output gap of 3.1 percent in 2010, as a result of growth that was far below long-term trends.

Looking forward, China’s trade surplus is likely to rise again as the rest of the world recovers. The differential output gap between China and its major trading partners likely reached its cyclically widest point in the first half of 2010. As China withdraws stimulus, its output likely will return to potential. As advanced countries recover, their output gaps will narrow, as they already have for the last two quarters, and the differential between China’s and advanced economies’ output gaps will narrow.

An Afghan Official Weighs In

2010-07-09T10:24:00.000-07:00

Turns out that was not my last post about Afghanistan or military affairs, this just came in from a friend of mine, graduate of Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and now a senior-level official in a crucial Afghanistan ministry.

I'll say MCCrystal replacement should have been done long ago... McCrystal was "fueling fire in order to stop the fire" ... Afghan government is in the middle of negotiation with the modern Taliban. McCrystal was hurdle for all this process and I believe Petraeus will be pretty useful in this context. One thing worries me is that McCrystal, although used power to beat the power, was close friend to Karzai...

So let's see how the Petraeus-Karzai dynamic will play out.

The only words I will say about military strategy

2010-07-06T17:33:00.000-07:00

I do not like to write on subjects I know little about, but I would like to offer a legal look at the COIN strategy and argue that Petraeus' replacement of McChrystal is not so perilous as some would argue. From Jim Fallows' blog, here's one of the arguments by a "US-policy insider" saying the replacement would be a huge setback:

Within the US military, the most controversial part of the McChrystal-blessed COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy is that U.S. troops should expose themselves to more risk, as part of minimizing "collateral damage" to civilians in Afghanistan. The point, obviously, is not to endanger the U.S. troops; it is to protect the local civilians in all ways. McChrystal, himself a famously fit and fearless Special Forces warrior, had the best chance of selling this policy to troops. Civilians and an "intellectual" commander like Petraeus would be less effective.

I didn't ask for the identity of this "insider", but I do not entirely agree with this particular argument.

First, General Petraeus is very well placed in executing the COIN strategy - he was a part of its initial doctrinal development and is very invested in its success. This point is offer by a friend of mine, a senior military official in the allied force with years of experience in Iraq, who also told me that General Petraeus had been very strong in pushing the message repeatedly in Iraq and they were having a great success.

Second, COIN strategy is designed with Iraq in mind, and has so far been more successful than any other strategy, but whether it would work as effective in Afghanistan is an open question. (a new Time article partly addressed this issue) So essentially, Obama need a man who would adapt, rather than adopt, the COIN strategy to Afghanistan.

Third, COIN is more than just the strategy. From a legal perspective, the value of the COIN strategy is that it gives lawyers greater flexibility in legal interpretation and allows for a nuanced and specifically targeted level of advice than the otherwise "vague" Laws of Armed Conflict would offer.

People familiar with the Laws of Armed Conflict know that it's “the result of an equitable balance between the necessities of war and humanitarian requirements.”1 Yet the two cardinal principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict: distinction and proportionality isn't that clear in all specific circumstances. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I), which, by the way, has not been ratified by the U.S. though some articles have become customary law, outlined the proportionality principle in Article 51(5)(b) which prohibits indiscriminate attack, including "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

Article 57(2)(b) on "Precautions in Attack" stipulates that "an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

The trouble is there is no standard as to what is "excessive": one civilian death to trade for one enemy death - is that acceptable? Or could we trade two civilian lives for one enemy death - bearing in mind that one enemy combatant might kill dozens of civilians?

Since the Vietnam War, two schools dominated the study of counterinsurgency: the "hearts and minds" school and the "capture and kill" school, with the former overpowering the latter among academics, politicians, and think tank analysts. 2 The COIN strategy is the brainchild of the first school. It seeks to understand the social and political context of applying force under the law. Here's the Manual on proportionality:

In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. But in COIN operations, [military] advantage is best calculated not in terms of
how many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or
detained . . . . In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property
destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could
do if allowed to escape. 3

I admit I know nothing about military strategy, or the war in Afghanistan, but from a legal perspective, I believe COIN is the way of the future (so to speak). Unlike a lot of policy-people or the pundits think, COIN strategy is not the simply idea of "protecting civilians at the expense of our troops", and the General doesn't need to "sell" this idea to the troops - the COIN strategy operates with a whole different mindset that enriches the international law framework the conflict has been and has to be fought within.

1. ICRC Commentary, supra note 101, para. 2206, at 683.

2. Mark Moyar, "Leadership in Counterinsurgency", 34 Fletcher F. World Aff. 135 2010
3. COIN Manual, supra note 5, at 247–48.

Book Review: Dreaming in Chinese

2010-07-05T19:18:00.000-07:00

I LOVE Deb Fallows' upcoming book Dreaming in Chinese - it's a must-read for people who just started to interact with this country and often times found themselves wondering "I'm saying the right thing! Why just can't they (the Chinese) understand me?" or the other way around - "I know what they are saying literally, but it doesn't make any sense to me. What do they mean?" Or, if you've had a lot of experience dealing with Chinese or have lived in China for a while, the familiar "cultural clash" moments in this book will surely bring a smile on your face and bring back a segment of memory with your own version of the story. Either way, it is a great read and I recommend it most enthusiastically.

Don't just take my words for it, I might be biased in this because I was eating a delicious birthday cake Deb baked for me while reading it and I love both Deb and Jim very much; New Yorker's Evan Osnos also wrote a nice review about it. Or you can check it out at bookstores yourself. It's coming out in U.S. in September! In the meantime, you can read Danwei's interview with Deb, and Beijinger's interview.

As a native Chinese with English training, the book brought to surface many interesting aspects of my mother language that I didn't really take notice before: our deliberate "impoliteness" with close friends, our inability to separate characters with their tones; and it reminded me of some unique difficulties Chinese face when learning English, for instance, differentiating "he" and "she". Speaking for myself, despite four years of studying of Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Whitman, despite the amount of reading I do as a Harvard grad student, I quite often mix up "he" and "she" in informal conversations. And with my knowledge in Japanese and limited exposure to Korean, it is equally hard for them to differentiate "he" and "she" too. Is the de-genderization of third-person pronounce unique to Asian languages?

Deb may not have all the scientific answers to all the questions, yet the wonderful thing about her book is that she makes the readers conscious of the cultural differences revealed by the linguistic differences, and invites readers to come up their own interpretations.

Reading into China's White Paper on the Internet

2010-06-09T15:55:00.000-07:00

China released it's White Paper on the Internet yesterday (Beijing June 9, 2011), full text in English here, in Chinese here, a brief English news report by China Daily here.

So what do we make of this story? The paragraph that has got a lot of attention starts like this:

Chinese citizens fully enjoy freedom of speech on the Internet. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China confers on Chinese citizens the right to free speech. With their right to freedom of speech on the Internet protected by the law, they can voice their opinions in various ways on the Internet.

Coming from a regime that is known to have censored Facebook, Wikipedia, Twitter, Youtube, even Gutenberg - the site that offers free classics, the farthest thing from porn or violence, this seems pretty hypocritical. Indeed, the succeeding part confirms this suspicion:

Vigorous online ideas exchange is a major characteristic of China's Internet development, and the huge quantity of BBS posts and blog articles is far beyond that of any other country. China's websites attach great importance to providing netizens with opinion expression services, with over 80% of them providing electronic bulletin service. In China, there are over a million BBSs and some 220 million bloggers. According to a sample survey, each day people post over three million messages via BBS, news commentary sites, blogs, etc., and over 66% of Chinese netizens frequently place postings to discuss various topics, and to fully express their opinions and represent their interests.

Do you see the contradictory? Maybe not at first sight, but as many Chinese netizens have pointed out, according to these official statistics, these channels of "vigorous-idea-exchange"- BBSs, carry less than an average 3 posts per day each - if all 3 million messages come from BBS and a little come from news commentary sites, blogs, microblogs, or anything else.

Netizens have called this "blatant lying", but then again, we are reminded that BBS posts as well as blog posts, comments, etc are heavily censored and monitored in China, and at the same time, there is an army of "fifty-cents party" allegedly paid by the government to make posts that swing towards the official line, which would mean, if any person would trust this "White Paper", that messages from real netizens were even less than the 3 million, not that so little is posted, but so many many many more is censored. The same post that pointed out this contradiction says this would mean 98% of the original posts are censored and never saw the light of the day.

I'm inclined to think that the White Paper drafters simply made these numbers up than to believe that censorship is so rampant as to make these numbers real. But this is not my concern, I'm interested in what this White Paper tells us about China's legal environment for the Internet.

One thing that struck me about this White Paper is the sheer number of laws, regulations, decisions, rules it mentioned, in order to, as we could safely assume, to draw legitimacy of the claims: a whole 18 of them, not including another six or seven conventions related to Internet management. Here is the thing: the more is not the better. The only "law" is Electronic Signatures Law (though there are other "laws" that contain articles related to the Internet, e.g. Article 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code pertain to computer hacking), the other regulations are issued by State Council, the Information and Technology Ministry, etc - and the execution and supervision of those regulations/decisions are carried out by the relevant ministries, security department, Administration for Industry and Commerce, Administration of Press and Publication, etc.

Here is the question: how do you expect an administrative body to write its own "law", AND to execute it, to monitor and supervise it?

Peking University Professor Hu Yong, who specialized in media and communications, has similar question and calls for more "constitutional thinking" in managing the Internet. He took the Green Dam disaster as an example of administrative agencies, in this case, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, went outside of the legal frame and issued an order that doesn't seem to come out of much deliberation of consequences, would adversely affect the lives of millions.

We should note that this unsystematic legal situation is not unique to laws regarding the Internet, but the whole body of what we call "Chinese law" is actually consisted of many many many individual statutes, decisions, orders, and of administrative regulations and rules made under different ad hoc policy orientations. The messiness increases because according to Administrative Litigation Law of China, the courts are not empowered to interpret a set of regulations or declare them unconstitutional or as exceeding their delegated authority – the most that the courts can do is determine that a specific application of a regulation (or law) to a specific individual (or a legal person) is unlawful and hence, should not be applicable in that instance or should be compensated for.

Although administrative regulations, district rules, etc, under Article 89 of the Law on Legislation should be reported to relevant higher authority: measures promulgated by the State Council, its Ministries and Commissions, and sub-national People’s Congresses are to be reported to the NPC Standing Committee and that those of People’s Governments are to be reported to higher levels of People’s Government through to the State Council and under the Constitution, the NPC Standing Committee can annul any State Council action and the NPC as a whole can do the same re any Standing Committee action (meaning that everything is potentially reviewable by the NPC).

In theory, these mechanisms are going to ensure that the measures are consistent with the Constitution and relevant laws (Note: China does not yet have a full constitutional review system). The challenges are: 1. According to Article 82 of the Law on Legislation, departmental rules and provincial level local regulations have comparable authority, thus there is the possibility of overlapping but not always consistent legal enactments. 2. Sub-national level agencies report both to the national ministry to which they belong, and their level of government.

So if I may make a suggestion here to the Chinese government here: censor the Internet all you want (netizens will only get better in getting around the GFW); make excuse for it; make up statistics if you like (and not be afraid of being caught lying); but please, review these rules, root out unconstitutional, illegal or inconsistent regulations, and have a real Internet law.

To digress a little, another point made pertinent in the White Paper is China's report on its "success" in bringing government online, claiming that it has built more than 45,000 government portal websites and that more than 80% of governments above county level have their own e-govern website. My friend Graham Webster wrote a brilliant A.M. thesis on this very subject, and finds that due to the lack of a centralized guideline/model for these websites, the city e-government websites are very diversified and lack of a common infrastructure; and if we were to see these websites as channels of citizen participation then the data these e-governments would get at their back end is very fragmented. (If you want to read his thesis, which I found very interesting, ask him for it:)

Death Penalty, Torture, and Criminal Justice in China

2010-06-01T20:14:00.001-07:00

reposted from my law school blog here.

China issued new regulations on May 30 banning evidence obtained through torture or intimidation, especially in death penalty cases. Konrad Lawson of the History Department has a very nice post here which puts this in a historical and comparative contexts, and inspired me to write this post, discussing them from more of a legal perspective.

The two regulations - Regulations on Several Issues in Investigating and Determining Evidence in Handling Death Penalty Cases, and Regulations on Several Issues in Disregarding Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases – were released jointly by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice. One curious thing about these two regulations is that there is no official texts of them to be found anywhere online – they are not on ANY of the websites of the above-mentioned five agencies that have supposably “released” it, and they are not to be found on Xinhua either, the Party-run official news agency which usually release full texts of new rules and regulations. The only text available, so far, that could tell people what the new regulations are about is an official Q & A (in Chinese). And the most substantive English coverage is from Xinhua.

Another interesting aspect of the “release” is the five agencies: the highest of judicial power, the highest of prosecution and supervision power (The Procuratorate), and the three agencies from the administration system. It shows that, on the one hand, the CCP is taking these two regulations very seriously, but on the other hand, it also shows the weakness of China’s judiciary – it takes 5 agencies to tell the law enforcement agencies and the like that they mean business. (But this is another topic that may get its own very long post)

So without the full texts of the two regulations and from what is covered in the Chinese press, it seems to me that one of the most exciting development is the emphasis on legal procedures. For instance, the Regulations on Illegal Evidence stipulates that not only is evidence obtained from substantive violation inadmissible and insubmissible such as that which is obtained through torture; but also evidence obtained through procedural violation such as one single investigator got the evidence by him/her-self. I hope this would be a precedent to a real criminal procedure law in China.

Another significant breakthrough is that the Regulations on Illegal Evidence for the first time states non-equivocally (again, since the full text is not available, this is just what’s stated by the official) that the prosecutor bears the burden of evidence, including using videos of the interrogation, or even calling witnesses to prove that the evidence is acquired legally and without coercion.

The Regulations on Death Penalty is considered, from the Chinese official perspective, an attempt to “strictly control [the sentencing of] death penalties”. Besides the procedural requirements for ascertaining doubtful evidence, Article 40 paragraph 2 prescribes that “… without sufficient evidence to prove that the accused has reached the age of 18 at the time of the accused crime and that this cannot be ascertained through investigation, it cannot be concluded that the accused is 18-year-old or above.”

But, and this is a big but as in any post about legal reform in China, these two regulations are far from enough to address the injustices in the criminal justice system in China. The current development is seen by many a response to the Zhao Zuohai case, in which a man got death penalty with a suspension of execution for murder (sentenced in 2002), only that on April 30, 2010, the person who were supposed be murdered walked back to the village very much alive. (NYT brief coverage) Coming out of the prison an innocent man, Zhao exposed the torture that had been inflicted upon him to elicit his confession to murder. But Zhao’s tragedy and many similar wrong death penalty cases before him (such as Nie Shubin case, and see a more comprehensive U.S. Congressional Report about this here) reveals more than just illegal practices in soliciting confession, but many other inadequacies in the criminal justice system.

Just for a start:

1. Lack of judicial independence.

Zhao’s case was twice rejected by the Procuratorate and was decided by the Municipal Political Legal Committee – this administrative organ supersedes the judiciary and the prosecutor. According to China News Weekly’s report in March this year, over half of the secretaries of Political Legal Committee at the provincial level are at the same time the head of the Police Department at the same level – the supervised has become the supervisor. In a society where the police directs, if not controls the Courts and the supervision organ, how can one expect the latter to put a check on the police? Prominent Chinese legal scholar, He Weifang, also points out that the head of the police usually enjoys higher position in the Communist Party than the president of the Court or the Procuratorate at the same level, and thus is endowed with more political clout, which the latter incapable of carrying out proper investigation of the police.

Even if we consider the Committe’s intervention in these criminal cases with the purest intention, as such an organ, its main priority, or mindset, is not the rule of law, but the current social political environment. Its considerations are: What is our current policy, hard on crime? The public are furious – maybe this case should reach a decision soon? Indeed, there is a reminiscent of the old practice in China’s legal decision up until the 1980s when there was almost always a line in death penalty cases that says “Not killing the accused cannot quell the public fury” as if it was not the law by which the court arrived at its decision, but by the consideration of public sentiment.

2. Inadequate criminal defense.

The law should broaden and deepen Lawyers’ involvement in criminal investigation procedures, for instance, requiring a defense lawyer’s presence at the time of interrogation unless in special circumstances, and strengthen criminal defense. In Zhao’s case, he was represented by an intern who had not even obtained a license to represent clients at the time of the trial.

3. No presumption of innocence.

China still does not have presumption of innocence before proven guilty stated explicitly in the law. The existing provision in Article 12 of Criminal Procedural Law renders the defendant not to be determined guilty until proven so, but it still doesn’t mean that he/she is innocent. In Zhao’s case, this leads to the suspension of the death sentence whereas he should be released because there were no sufficient evidence to prove him guilty.

Also there is no right to remain silent in China – which is also a reason why the tortures occur. And the traditional mentality that confession is very important, despite the laws, especially these two regulations, stating that case should be decided on evidence.

Towards the end of the post, I just want to put up this notice for those who are interested in China’s criminal justice. No doubt, Professor Cohen would be a much MUCH better in elucidating on this subject.

Friday, June 4, 4:15 p.m.
Fairbank Center Special Guest Presentation

June 4^th and China’s Criminal Justice, Then and Now

Jerome Cohen, Professor, New York University School of Law, and Co-Director of the US-Asia Law Institute
Professor Cohen will discuss the immediate impact of the Tiananmen Square events of June 4, 1989, on China’s fledgling criminal justice system. The subsequent effort to reform the system culminated in the new Criminal Procedure Law of 1996. He will discuss how that law has been implemented and violated until now and the current pressures for further reform of the system.

CGIS South, Belfer Case Study Room (S020), 1730 Cambridge Street, Cambridge