Within the US military, the most controversial part of the McChrystal-blessed COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy is that U.S. troops should expose themselves to more risk, as part of minimizing "collateral damage" to civilians in Afghanistan. The point, obviously, is not to endanger the U.S. troops; it is to protect the local civilians in all ways. McChrystal, himself a famously fit and fearless Special Forces warrior, had the best chance of selling this policy to troops. Civilians and an "intellectual" commander like Petraeus would be less effective.
I didn't ask for the identity of this "insider", but I do not entirely agree with this particular argument.
First, General Petraeus is very well placed in executing the COIN strategy - he was a part of its initial doctrinal development and is very invested in its success. This point is offer by a friend of mine, a senior military official in the allied force with years of experience in Iraq, who also told me that General Petraeus had been very strong in pushing the message repeatedly in Iraq and they were having a great success.
First, General Petraeus is very well placed in executing the COIN strategy - he was a part of its initial doctrinal development and is very invested in its success. This point is offer by a friend of mine, a senior military official in the allied force with years of experience in Iraq, who also told me that General Petraeus had been very strong in pushing the message repeatedly in Iraq and they were having a great success.
Second, COIN strategy is designed with Iraq in mind, and has so far been more successful than any other strategy, but whether it would work as effective in Afghanistan is an open question. (a new Time article partly addressed this issue) So essentially, Obama need a man who would adapt, rather than adopt, the COIN strategy to Afghanistan.
Third, COIN is more than just the strategy. From a legal perspective, the value of the COIN strategy is that it gives lawyers greater flexibility in legal interpretation and allows for a nuanced and specifically targeted level of advice than the otherwise "vague" Laws of Armed Conflict would offer.
People familiar with the Laws of Armed Conflict know that it's “the result of an equitable balance between the necessities of war and humanitarian requirements.”1 Yet the two cardinal principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict: distinction and proportionality isn't that clear in all specific circumstances. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I), which, by the way, has not been ratified by the U.S. though some articles have become customary law, outlined the proportionality principle in Article 51(5)(b) which prohibits indiscriminate attack, including "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Article 57(2)(b) on "Precautions in Attack" stipulates that "an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
The trouble is there is no standard as to what is "excessive": one civilian death to trade for one enemy death - is that acceptable? Or could we trade two civilian lives for one enemy death - bearing in mind that one enemy combatant might kill dozens of civilians?
Since the Vietnam War, two schools dominated the study of counterinsurgency: the "hearts and minds" school and the "capture and kill" school, with the former overpowering the latter among academics, politicians, and think tank analysts. 2 The COIN strategy is the brainchild of the first school. It seeks to understand the social and political context of applying force under the law. Here's the Manual on proportionality:
I admit I know nothing about military strategy, or the war in Afghanistan, but from a legal perspective, I believe COIN is the way of the future (so to speak). Unlike a lot of policy-people or the pundits think, COIN strategy is not the simply idea of "protecting civilians at the expense of our troops", and the General doesn't need to "sell" this idea to the troops - the COIN strategy operates with a whole different mindset that enriches the international law framework the conflict has been and has to be fought within.
Third, COIN is more than just the strategy. From a legal perspective, the value of the COIN strategy is that it gives lawyers greater flexibility in legal interpretation and allows for a nuanced and specifically targeted level of advice than the otherwise "vague" Laws of Armed Conflict would offer.
People familiar with the Laws of Armed Conflict know that it's “the result of an equitable balance between the necessities of war and humanitarian requirements.”1 Yet the two cardinal principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict: distinction and proportionality isn't that clear in all specific circumstances. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I), which, by the way, has not been ratified by the U.S. though some articles have become customary law, outlined the proportionality principle in Article 51(5)(b) which prohibits indiscriminate attack, including "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Article 57(2)(b) on "Precautions in Attack" stipulates that "an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
The trouble is there is no standard as to what is "excessive": one civilian death to trade for one enemy death - is that acceptable? Or could we trade two civilian lives for one enemy death - bearing in mind that one enemy combatant might kill dozens of civilians?
Since the Vietnam War, two schools dominated the study of counterinsurgency: the "hearts and minds" school and the "capture and kill" school, with the former overpowering the latter among academics, politicians, and think tank analysts. 2 The COIN strategy is the brainchild of the first school. It seeks to understand the social and political context of applying force under the law. Here's the Manual on proportionality:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. But in COIN operations, [military] advantage is best calculated not in terms of
how many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or
detained . . . . In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property
destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could
do if allowed to escape. 3
I admit I know nothing about military strategy, or the war in Afghanistan, but from a legal perspective, I believe COIN is the way of the future (so to speak). Unlike a lot of policy-people or the pundits think, COIN strategy is not the simply idea of "protecting civilians at the expense of our troops", and the General doesn't need to "sell" this idea to the troops - the COIN strategy operates with a whole different mindset that enriches the international law framework the conflict has been and has to be fought within.
1. ICRC Commentary, supra note 101, para. 2206, at 683.
2. Mark Moyar, "Leadership in Counterinsurgency", 34 Fletcher F. World Aff. 135 2010
3. COIN Manual, supra note 5, at 247–48.
3. COIN Manual, supra note 5, at 247–48.
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